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Abstract: The privacy of users and information are becoming increasingly important with the
growth and pervasive use of mobile devices such as wearables, mobile phones, drones, and Internet
of Things (IoT) devices. Today many of these mobile devices are equipped with cameras which
enable users to take pictures and record videos anytime they need to do so. In many such cases,
bystanders’ privacy is not a concern, and as a result, audio and video of bystanders are often
captured without their consent. We present results from a user study in which 21 participants were
asked to use a wearable system called FacePET developed to enhance bystanders’ facial privacy by
providing a way for bystanders to protect their own privacy rather than relying on external systems
for protection. While past works in the literature focused on privacy perceptions of bystanders when
photographed in public/shared spaces, there has not been research with a focus on user perceptions
of bystander-based wearable devices to enhance privacy. Thus, in this work, we focus on user
perceptions of the FacePET device and/or similar wearables to enhance bystanders’ facial privacy.
In our study, we found that 16 participants would use FacePET or similar devices to enhance their
facial privacy, and 17 participants agreed that if smart glasses had features to conceal users’
identities, it would allow them to become more popular.
Keywords: bystanders’ privacy; facial privacy; face detection; face recognition; Internet of Things;
wearables; usability; usable privacy; adversarial machine learning

1. Introduction
The availability of cameras and Artificial Intelligence (AI) through wearables, mobile phones,
drones, and Internet of Things (IoT) devices is making bystanders’ facial privacy more significant to
the general public. Bystanders’ privacy arises when a device that collects sensor data (such as photos,
sound or video) can be used to identify third-parties (or their actions) when they have not given
consent to be part of the collection [1,2]. Even though bystanders’ privacy has been an issue since the
end of the 19th century with the invention of portable cameras that could take photos in a short
amount of time [1], recent advances of camera-enabled devices (e.g., mobile phones, IoT) combined
with Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the Internet have raised awareness about this privacy issue
especially in the last couple of years. We show in Figure 1 some of issues related to bystanders’ facial
privacy.
IoT 2020, 1, 198–217; doi:10.3390/iot1020013
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Figure 1. Issues related to bystanders’ privacy. Our focus in this work is to study bystanders’
perceptions of a bystander-centric device/system to enhance facial privacy.

Recently, various solutions [3–24] that address bystanders’ privacy have been proposed in the
literature. However, most of these solutions rely on bystanders trusting third-party devices or
systems which do not give a choice to protect their privacy. To enable bystanders to protect their
privacy, we have developed the Facial Privacy Enhancing Technology (FacePET) [25] smart wearable
device. FacePET is a wearable system made of intelligent goggles worn by bystanders to protect their
privacy from unauthorized face detection. FacePET operates on image features (in particular Haarlike features [26]) through visible light produced by the FacePET goggles to confuse face detection
algorithms based on the Viola–Jones face detection algorithm [27]. If an unauthorized party takes a
photo of the bystander with the FacePET system enabled, the action on the features is registered in
the photo. Thus, if later an Artificial Intelligence (AI) algorithm based on the Viola–Jones algorithm
attempts to detect a bystander’s face, the goal of the FacePET is to prevent detection of the bystander’s
facial features by the AI algorithm.
The FacePET goggles are controlled via a mobile application at the bystanders’ mobile phone
which permits the bystander to create privacy policies to automatically provide consent to third-party
cameras. When a third-party authorized by the bystander wants to take a photo of the bystander,
FacePET turns off the goggles and disables the operation.
The concept of consent is a cornerstone in privacy [28–30], and in this context, FacePET improves
upon previous bystander-based approaches to protect facial privacy by allowing the bystander to
create his/her own privacy policies and provide the consent. We describe the complete FacePET
system, how it acts on Haar-like features based on the Viola–Jones face detection algorithm, and its
effectiveness in [25].
In this work, we present the results of a small user study with a focus on perceptions of users
about the FacePET system and intelligent goggles with features to mitigate facial detection
algorithms. While there have been past works [8,14,31–40] on understanding the perceptions of
bystanders with respect to facial privacy, to the best of our knowledge, our user study is the first to
address the perceptions of a smart wearable (IoT) system worn by bystanders with a privacy
protection focus.
Research contributions of this work
We summarize the main research contributions of this work as follows:
•
•
•

We present a summary of human–computer interaction studies and systems related to facial
privacy.
We present a user study of the FacePET system with a focus on users’ perceptions about the
device and intelligent goggles with features to mitigate facial detection algorithms.
We discuss the results of the study to further enhance the FacePET system, as well as influence
the development of future bystander-centric devices for facial privacy.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of related works. In
Section 3 we describe the FacePET system. Section 4 presents the results of our usability evaluation
of FacePET. Finally, in Section 5, we make some concluding remarks and present future work.
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2. Related Works
2.1. Bystanders’ Facial Privacy: Human–Computer Interaction (HCI) Perspective
From the HCI perspective, research studies related to bystanders’ privacy can be classified into
two groups: (1) understanding the utilization/adoption of mobile, camera-enabled devices (i.e.,
mobile phones, wearables, IoT, and drones), and related technologies in shared spaces; (2) usability
studies for facial privacy systems. These studies have been conducted using a variety of methods
such as interviews, analysis of logged data (i.e., voice-mail diaries), online web comments, surveys,
and a combination of more than one of these methods. We highlight some of these studies in Table 1.
Table 1. Human–Computer Interaction (HCI) studies related to Bystanders’ Facial Privacy.

Reference

Palen et al.
[31]

Research Focus

Mobile phones in
shared spaces

Approach
19 new mobile phone
users tracked for six
weeks. Voice mail
diaries, interviews and
calling behavior data
collected for four
months

Denning
et al. [32]

Augmented Reality
(AR) glasses

12 field sessions with 31
bystanders interviewed
and their reactions to a
co-located AR device

Motti et al.
[33]

Wearable devices
including armbands,
smart watches,
earpieces, head bands,
headphones and smart
glasses

Observational study of
online comments
posted by wearable
users. A total of 72
privacy comments
analyzed

Lifelogging with
wearable camera
devices

In situ user study in
which 36 participants
wore a lifelogging
device for a week,
answered
questionnaires on
photos captured, and
participated in an exit
interview

Privacy perceptions of
online photos

Survey deployed
through Amazon
Mechanical Turk
(mTurk) with 279
respondents. Survey
used 60 photos
showing 10 different
contextual conditions

Hoyle et
al. [34]

Hoyle et
al. [35]

Comments
Users were inclined to modify
their perceptions on social
appropriateness from initial
use. Highlighted a conflict of
spaces (physical vs. virtual)
Participants identified different
factors on making recording
more/less acceptable and they
expressed interest on being
asked for consent to be
recorded and record-blocking
devices
Identified 13 user’s concerns
about wearable privacy related
to the type of data and how
device collects, stores,
processes and shares data.
Concerns depend on type and
design of device
Users preferred to manage
privacy through in situ
physical control of image
collection (rather than later),
context determines sensitivity,
and users were concerned
about bystanders’ privacy
although almost no opposition
or concerns were expressed by
bystanders during study
Respondents shared common
expectations on the privacy
norms of online images. Norms
are socially contingent and
multidimensional. Social
contexts and sharing can affect
social meaning of privacy
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Zhang et
al. [36]

Hatuka et
al. [37]

Wang et
al. [38]

Chang et
al. [39]

Steil at al.
[8]
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Privacy attitudes on
video analytics
technologies

10 day longitudinal in
situ study involving
123 participants and
2,328 deployment
scenarios

Privacy preferences vary with a
number of factors (context).
Some contexts make people
feel uncomfortable. People
have little awareness on the
contexts where video analytics
can be deployed

Smartphone users’
perceptions about
contemporary
meaning of
public/private spaces

Correlational study
with 138 participants
who took surveys and
were observed by
researchers for three
months. Participants
divided in two groups:
basic phone users and
advanced smart phone
users

Differences on the meaning of
public/private spaces may be
blurred and may be
dynamically redefined by use
of technology

Civilian use of
drones/Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)

16 semi-structured
interviews to examine
people’s perceptions on
drones and usage
under five specific
scenarios. Participants
were shown a real
drone and videos about
its capabilities before
interview

Drones

User evaluation of a
privacy-preserving
device to block a headmount camera

Laboratory study with
20 participants using
real and simulated
drones to elicit user
perceptions about
drone security and
privacy. Study also
used surveys,
interviews and drone
piloting exercises
12 participants with
semi-structured one-toone interviews to
evaluate an eye
gesture-activated firstperson camera shutter
blocker device
controlled by Artificial
Intelligence (AI)
17 participants
annotated video
datasets for training
data

Differences on the meaning of
public/private spaces for
participants. Participants
highlighted inconspicuous
recording and inaccessible
drone pilots to request for
privacy as concerns and some
participants expected for
expected for consent to be
asked before recording by
drones
Drone design affects privacy
and raises security concerns
with drones. Recommended
the use of geo-fencing to
address privacy concerns,
designated flyzones/“highways” for drones.
Auditive and wind clues to
inform of drone usage for
bystanders
Eye-tracking can be used as a
way to handle bystanders’
privacy as camera activates
when person fixes eyesight.
Non-invasive on the user. Eye
tracking not perceived in
general as a threat to privacy
by participants.
Privacy sensitivity varies
largely among people, thus
affecting the definition of
privacy
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Aditya et
al. [14]

Ahmad et
al. [40]

Our
approach
(FacePET)
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Personal expectations
and desires for privacy
on photos when
photographed as a
bystander

Survey deployed online
via Google Forms with
227 respondents from
32 different countries

Privacy concerns and privacy
actions varied based on context
(i.e., location, social situations)

People’s perceptions of
and behaviors around
current IoT devices as
bystanders

Interview study with 19
participants

Participants expressed
concerns about uncertainty of
IoT device’s state (if they were
recording or not) and their
purpose when being
bystanders around these
devices

User study of a
bystander-based
wearable (smart
glasses) to attack facial
detection algorithms

21 participants took
survey on bystanders’
privacy, wore the
FacePET device, saw
the results of facial
privacy protection on
their faces, and
answered questions on
the usability of FacePET

Most participants would use
FacePET or a bystander-based
facial privacy device. Most
participants agreed that facial
privacy features would
improve the use and adoption
of smart glasses

We describe below some of the common findings among these studies:
•

•

•
•

Seven studies in Table 1 recruited less than 36 participants (five studies recruited 20 or less
participants [8,31,38–40], and two studies recruited less than 36 participants [32,34]. Only two
studies recruited more than 100 participants [36,37]. The studies with less than 36 participants
use interviews, observation, testing of devices and some of them use surveys. The studies with
more than 100 participants use surveys or automated ways (AI) to gather data of interest.
The definitions of private/public (shared) spaces and privacy perceptions vary among
individuals. What is meant for a private/public space seems to depend on context (i.e.,
individuals, actions and devices used at any given location).
The design of the data capturing device has an impact on user and bystanders’ privacy
perceptions.
Individuals want to have control of their facial privacy even though some contexts are less
private-sensitive than others.

In contrast to the related works discussed above which focused primarily on privacy perceptions
of users/bystanders when photographed in shared/public spaces by different kinds of devices, and
their perceptions about how these photographs are shared in social networks and used by external
parties (i.e., in web/remote services for facial recognition), in this work we explore the perceptions of
a bystander-centric device (smart goggles) to protect bystanders’ facial privacy. To the best of our
knowledge, our study is the first study to explore user perceptions of a bystander-centric
IoT/wearable system with a focus on privacy.
2.2. Bystanders’ Facial Privacy: Solutions
In the past we proposed a taxonomy [1] to classify solutions to handle bystanders’ facial privacy.
Our taxonomy is composed of two major groups of solutions: location-dependent methods and
obfuscation-dependent methods. Methods in these categories have differences in terms of
effectiveness [25], usability [41], and power consumption [42]. We show this taxonomy in Figure 2
and we present a summary of methods under each category in Table 2.
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Figure 2. Taxonomy of methods for bystanders’ privacy protection [1].

2.2.1. Location-Dependent Methods
The focus of location-dependent methods is to disable/enable the utilization of a capturing
device at a particular location [43,44] or context. Location-based methods can be divided into two
categories:
• Banning/Confiscating devices: Even though they are non-technological solutions,
banning/confiscating devices are the oldest method to handle bystanders’ privacy. In the U.S.,
this method was first used starting from the development of portable photographic cameras at
the end of the 19th century [45]. Around this time, cameras were forbidden at some public spaces
and private venues.
• Disabling devices: In this group the goal is to disable a capturing device to protect bystanders’
privacy. Methods under this category can be further classified based on the technology used to
disable the capturing device. In the first group (sensor saturation), a capturing device is disabled
by some type of signal that interferes with a sensor that collects identifiable data [3]. In the
broadcasting of commands group, a capturing device receives disabling messages via data
communication interfaces (i.e., Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, infrared) [4,5]. In the last group (context-based
approaches) the capturing device identifies contexts using badges, labels, or it recognizes
contexts [46] using Artificial Intelligence (AI) methods to determine if capturing cannot take place
[6–8].
2.2.2. Obfuscation-Dependent Methods
The goal of obfuscation-dependent methods is to hide the identity of bystanders to avoid their
identification. Depending on who performs the action to hide a bystander, these methods can be
classified into two categories:
•

•

Bystander-based obfuscation: In this category, bystanders avoid their facial identification either by
using technological solutions to hide or perturb bystanders’ identifiable features, or by
performing a physical action such as asking somebody to stop capturing data, or simply leaving
a shared/public space. Our FacePET [25] wearable device falls into this category.
Device-based obfuscation: In this group, third-party devices which are not owned by the bystander
perform blurring or add noise (in the signal processing sense) to the image captured from the
bystander to hide his/her identity. Depending on how the software at the capturing device
performs the blurring, solutions in this category can be further classified into default obfuscation
(any face in the image will be blurred) [19], selective obfuscation (third-party device users select
who to obfuscate in the image) [20], or collaborative obfuscation (third-party and bystander’s
device collaborate via wireless protocols [47] to allow a face to be blurred) [21]. A drawback of
device-based obfuscation method is that a bystander must trust a device that he/she does not
control to protect his/her privacy.

IoT 2020, 1

204

Table 2. Recently proposed technological solutions for bystanders’ facial privacy.

Category

Location

Methods disable or ban the utilization of
capturing devices

Subcategory
Disabling devices–sensor
saturation
Disabling services–
Broadcasting of commands

Disabling devices–contextbased

Bystander–based

Obfuscation

Device-based–default

Methods hide the identity of bystanders’
faces to avoid identification
Device-based–selective

Device-based–collaborative

Method
BlindSpot [3]
Using infrared to disable
devices [4]
Using Bluetooth to
disable devices [5]
Virtual Walls [6]
Privacy-restricted areas
[7]
World-driven access
control [15]
Sensor Tricorder [16]
PlaceAvoider [17]
PrivacEye: [8]
NotiSense [9]
PrivacyVisor [10]
PrivacyVisor III [11]
Perturbed eyeglass frames
[12]
Invisibility Glasses [18]
Privacy Google
StreetView [19]
ObscuraCam [13]
Respectful cameras [21]
Invisible Light Beacons
[23]
Negative face blurring
[24]
I–pic [14]
PrivacyCamera [20]
Do Not Capture [22]

3. The FacePET System
3.1. Adversarial Machine Learning Attacks on the Viola–Jones Algorithm
To detect a face automatically in an image, supervised machine learning (classification) methods
in image processing can be used. Given an image/photo x and a face detection (classification)
method/algorithm Fd, the goal of Fd is to classify (or assign a label) to the image x such that if x
contains a face, then Fd(x) = 1, and if x does not contain a face then Fd(x) = 0.
The process of finding a vulnerability to make classification algorithms fail is an application of
a field called adversarial machine learning [48,49] which studies how an adversary/attacker can
generate attacks to render machine learning models/methods ineffective. For face detection, this
process can be done by applying a transformation Tr(x) on the image such that if Fd(x) = 1, then
Fd(Tr(x)) = 0. In other words, if x contains a face, the goal of an adversary during the face detection
process is to find a method/transformation of a face in x so the face detection method does not detect
the face. The transformation can be done after the image x has been captured by a camera, which in
this case, Tr(x) is performed by software, or Tr(x) can be generated as part of the process to capture
an image wherein a person (i.e., a bystander) in the photo has a physical method to execute the
transformation which is recorded/stored in the image. Thus, the goal for FacePET is to physically
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generate a transformation to prevent the Haar-like features from being used by the face detection
(classification) algorithm. A Haar-like feature is calculated using the following formula:
h(r1, r2) = s(r1) − s(r2)

(1)

In this formula, s(r1) is the average of pixel intensities in “white” regions, and s(r2) is the average
of pixel intensities in the “black” regions of predefined black/white patterns that are juxtaposed over
an image (or a region of an image). The patterns are engineered to train classification models using
machine learning algorithms and the Haar-like features. Once the model is trained, the patterns are
used in images to calculate the Haar-like features, which then serve as inputs to the trained classifier.
Figure 3 presents the predefined black/white patterns used by Viola–Jones to calculate Haar-like
features for face detection.

Figure 3. Predefined patterns to calculate Haar-like features in the Viola and Jones algorithm [27].

When using these patterns, the Viola–Jones algorithm creates windows of different sizes (subregions/sub images), calculates the Haar-like features for each window using the patterns, and then
each window is passed through a classifier Fd(x) that outputs 1 if a face is detected. Performing
adversarial attacks on a Viola–Jones face detection algorithm can be achieved by generating noise (in
the signal processing sense) in the bystander’s face (or photo) such that the values of the Haar-like
features make a Viola–Jones classifier fail.
In FacePET [25], PrivacyVisor [10], and Invisibility glasses [18], these attacks are performed
using Light Emitting Diodes (LEDs) (either through visible light in the case of FacePET or infrared
light in the case of PrivacyVisor and Invisibility glasses) embedded in goggles. Figure 4 shows an
example of a detected face without the attack (Figure 4a) and an undetected face with the attack
(Figure 4b). This figure shows screenshots of an application that we created using the OpenCV’s
implementation of the Viola–Jones algorithm to demonstrate the attack on the Haar-like features. We
note that when the face is detected the software superimposes a blue square around the area of the
face, and green squares around the area of the eyes and mouth (Figure 4a). However, when the
features are attacked, the software fails to detect the face (Figure 4b) and no squares are superimposed
on the face.

(a)

(b)

Figure 4. Face detection with the Viola–Jones algorithm (a) Face detected/FacePET googles off; (b)
Face not detected/FacePET with goggles on. The superposed blue and green squares in the left figure
indicate the detection of a face. In the right figure, the attack with the LEDs is successful because no
squares are superimposed (attack on Haar-like features performed).
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Recent advances in deep learning and Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) have improved
the accuracy of image processing methods, including face detection methods. While in Viola–Jones
methods the features for face detection are hand-crafted through the use patterns and Haar-like
features to achieve the detection, in CNN-based algorithms there is no need for any of the two,
because CNN can learn the features needed to achieve the detection through the automated training
of neural networks [50]. However, CNNs for face detection can also be subject to adversarial machine
learning attacks that include the optimization of adversarial generator networks for face detection
[51], image-level distortions (i.e., modifications of the image’s appearance not related to faces) and
face-level distortions (i.e., modifications of facial landmarks in an image) [52].
3.2. The Facial Privacy Enabled Technology (FacePET) System
In Section 2.2, we described different classes of facial privacy systems that are not controlled by
bystanders, and many do not provide a choice for bystanders before a photo is taken (i.e., still a
bystander can be photographed inadvertently and identified without consent). These systems require
bystanders to trust other parties to protect their own facial privacy without a choice or assurances to
bystanders that their privacy is indeed being protected. We argue that the best types of facial privacy
systems are those that provide methods for bystanders to make choices for their own facial privacy
before a photo can be taken. We developed FacePET [25] under this premise. Figure 5 shows the
components of the FacePET system.

Figure 5. The FacePET system.

The major components of FacePET include:
•

•

FacePET wearable: The FacePET wearable (as Figure 6 shows) is composed of goggles with 6
strategically placed Light Emitting Diodes (LEDs), a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)-enabled
microcontroller, and a power supply. When a bystander wears and activates the wearable, the
FacePET wearable emits green light that generates noise (in the signal processing sense) and
confuse Haar-like features for the Viola–Jones algorithm. The BLE microcontroller allows the
bystander to turn on/off the lights through a Graphical User Interface (GUI) implemented as a
mobile application and runs on the bystanders’ mobile phone.
FacePET mobile applications: We implemented two mobile applications for the FacePET system.
The first mobile application, namely the Bystander’s mobile app implements a GUI to turn on/off
the FacePET wearable through commands broadcast using BLE communications. The
Bystander’s mobile app also implements an Access Control List (ACL) in which third-party
cameras are authorized to disable the wearable and take photos. Different types of policies can
be enforced for external parties to disable the wearable. For example, for a specific third-party
user, the Bystander’s mobile app can limit the number of times the wearable can be disabled for
that third-party user. Further privacy policies based on contexts (i.e., location) can also be
implemented. The second app, called the Third-party (stranger) mobile application, issues requests
to disable the wearable and take photos of the bystander with wearable’s lights off. In the current
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prototype, the Third-party (stranger) mobile application connects to the Bystander’s mobile app via
Bluetooth [53]. Figure 7 presents screenshots of both mobile applications.
FacePET consent protocol: The FacePET consent protocol (as Figure 8 shows) enables a mechanism
that creates a list of trusted cameras (an ACL) at the bystander’s mobile application. In our
current prototype the consent protocol is implemented over Bluetooth.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)
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Figure 6. The FacePET wearable device. (a) Wiring sketch diagram for FacePET LEDs; (b) Schematic;
(c) Goggles with LEDs and BLE microcontroller; (d) FacePET wearable prototype worn by a
bystander.

(a)

(b)
Figure 7. FacePET’s system mobile app screenshots. (a) Bystanders’ application; (b) Stranger (thirdparty).

Figure 8. Sequence diagram for FacePET’s consent protocol.
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4. A User Evaluation on Perceptions of FacePET and Bystander-Based Facial Privacy Devices
4.1. Methodology
We applied for an approval from the CSU’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) to conduct our
study. The initial recruitment of participants was conducted by sending a flyer through Columbus
State University’s (CSU) e-mail system. The flyer explained the steps for participants to take part in
the study which was performed in a room at the CSU’s Synovous Center for Commerce and
Technology. Once in the room, each participant filled out an informed consent form that provided
information about the research and its risks. Next, participants filled out an initial survey (called the
“Bystander’s Privacy Survey”) to gauge their knowledge about the concept of bystanders’ privacy as
well as their personal preferences on having their photos taken in certain situations and places. We
used questions from the survey developed for the I-Pic system [14]. Figure 9 shows the questions
asked in the survey.
After the initial survey, participants wore the FacePET wearable and had their photo taken using
the rear-facing camera of an iPhone 7 in an indoor setting (i.e., a lab) with the wearable system being
active and inactive. The captured photos were then used as input in a Python application that used
the OpenCV’s face detection Application Programming Interface (API) [26] implementation which
provides an open source implementation of the Viola–Jones face detection algorithm [27]. Figure 3
shows screenshots of this application. The results of the face detection were presented to the
participants (as Figure 3 shows) before they filled out a second survey (called the “Usability Survey”)
about the use of the wearable device and their attitudes about it. Figure 10 shows the questions we
asked in this second survey. Once this second survey was completed, the participants concluded their
participation in the study. A total of n = 21 participants took part of this study and we raffled a gift
card for USD 25.00 among the participants as an incentive reward for their participation. Table 3
presents the participants’ demographics in this study. All participants were at least 18 years old.

Figure 9. Bystanders’ privacy survey questions.
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Figure 10. FacePET’s usability/user perceptions survey questions.
Table 3. Participant demographics.

Participants’ Characteristics
Less than 20 years
Age group
20–30 years
30–40 years
Male
Gender
Female
High school
Some college credits
Educational level Associate’s degree
Bachelor’s degree
Master’s degree

Number of Participants
1
17
3
14
7
1
14
1
4
1

4.2. Study Results
The initial bystanders’ privacy survey assessed the participant’s knowledge about facial and
bystanders’ privacy and how it affects them. Participants were first asked questions about how they
feel themselves with respect to technology and how often they took pictures and videos. They were
also asked how much they knew about the issue of bystanders’ privacy and if they found it to be an
important issue in today’s world. Out of the 21 participants, 19 of them considered themselves to be
tech savvy. When asked how often they took pictures/videos, 11 participants took pictures often while
the rest answered not so often (8 participants) or very little (2 participants). When asked about
bystanders’ privacy and how much they knew about bystanders’ privacy, surprisingly, most of them
did not know much about the issue or not at all (11 participants adding both choices). In this question, 2
participants stated that they knew a lot about it and 7 participants stated that they knew enough. After
these questions and being introduced to the topic, most of the participants were in agreement that it
is an important issue in today’s world (18 participants), and the rest stating that it was not (3 participants).
When asked about the preferred privacy actions in certain contexts such as being at the gym, in a
bar, at the beach, among others (see Figure 11), the participants were given for each situation five
choices (I agree to be captured in any photograph; I agree to be captured, but please send me a copy of any
photograph that includes me; Please obscure my appearance in any photograph that includes me; I can decide
my preference only after I see the photograph; I do not wish to be captured in any photograph). The most
common choice among all contexts was “I can decide my preference only after I see the photograph” (32%
of all choices). The second most frequent choice was “I agree to be captured in any photograph” with
28.07% of all choices). It is worth noting that in general, 15 participants chose a privacy action other
than always agreeing to be photographed. This result demonstrates that, among our survey
participants, they prefer some type of privacy protection when photographed. In this part of the
survey we had a total of 228 answers.
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From the results of the survey, we found that the participants of our study prefer to be
photographed without restrictions in some communal places and activities such as outdoor activities,
workplaces, at private gatherings with known people (i.e., family and friends), while they do not
wish to be photograph in places and activities related to health (i.e, at hospitals, at gyms). It worth
noting that the most preferred choice for places such as in bars/nightclubs, at the beach, at a place of
worship, and in a restaurant was “I can decide my preference only after I see the photograph”. These results
show that, in health-related activities, and in contexts that involve consumer/lifestyle habits (i.e., bars,
beaches, and restaurants) participants of the study want to control their privacy. This conclusion is
similar to past works with a focus on bystander’s privacy perceptions (as described in Section 2.1).
Participants' Preferred Privacy Actions
A) I agree to be captured in any photograph.
B) I agree to be captured, but please send me a copy of any photograph that includes me.
C) Please obscure my appearance in any photograph that includes me.
D) I can decide my preference only after I see the photograph.
E) I do not wish to be captured in any photograph.

At the gym
At a public gathering (e.g.
exhibitions, concerts, movies,
etc.)

12

10

Engaging in a daily outdoor
activity (e.g. walking cycling,
going to market places, etc.)

8

At a private gathering with
family or friends (e.g.
birthdays, weddings, etc.)

6

In a bar or a nightclub
4

2

0

In a restaurant

At a hospital

Using public transportation

At the beach

At my workplace

At a place of worship

Figure 11. Participants’ preferred privacy actions in various contexts. The scale in the radar chart
indicate frequency of participants and the lines indicate a context. Vertices indicate a privacy action.

The last section of the initial bystanders’ privacy survey evaluated the participants’ comfort
levels about who may be a photographer taking photos of them and what the photographer can do
with the photos regardless of any specific situation. For each type of photographer/action, the
participant could choose five comfort levels (in a Likert scale). Figure 12 shows the results of these
questions. In the figure, the Likert scale has been reduced to three categories to simplify the
visualization and analysis. In these questions, less comfortable choices (little less and much less)
represented 35.24% of all choices, neutral choice (“I will feel the same”) represented 32.86% of all
choices, and more comfortable choices represented 31.9%. In these questions, participants felt more
comfortable in situations where there was some type of privacy protection or the photographer was
somebody professional or known to the participant. Finally, participants felt less comfortable if the
photos were to be published without consent, if the photographer was a stranger, and if there were
children in the proximity of the photo. These results demonstrate that participants were concerned
about their facial privacy when photos are taken and published without their knowledge. In this part
of the survey there were 210 answers. The results in this part of the study are similar to past works
in the area of bystanders’ perceptions on photo sharing (see Section 2.1).
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Participants' Comfort Levels
More Comfortable

Neutral

Less Comfortable

The photographer is a professional
photographer (e.g. wedding
photographer, journalist, artist, etc.)
The photograph may be published
online without my knowledge (e.g.
social networks)

18
16
14

The photograph will be limited to
personal use by the photographer

12
10

There are minor children in your
vicinity who might also be
photographed

8

I am photographed while I am with
acquaintances

6
4
2
0

The photograph may be published
online and I am notified afterwards
(e.g. social networks)

I am photographed while I am with
strangers

The photographer is a stranger

The photograph may be posted in a
forum with restricted membership
(e.g. company/university mailing list)

The photographer is an acquaintance

Figure 12. Participants’ comfort levels on photographers and actions with photos. The scale in the
chart shows the frequency of participants and the lines indicate a comfort level. Vertices indicate a
context.

The participants then wore the FacePET system. Each individual was photographed using the
rear-facing camera of an Apple iPhone 7 mobile phone with the device enabled (privacy protection)
and disabled. These photos were then fed into the OpenCV’s face detection script (Figure 3). Out of
the 21 participants, six participants’ faces were detected, giving the device’s a success rate in
protecting a user’s face around 71%. A handful of the participants also took pictures using their own
mobile phones so that comparisons could be made for how effective the device worked regardless of
the different cameras. The participants were then shown the results of the application (Figure 3) and
then they answered the usability/user perceptions survey shown in Figure 10.
While conducting the experiment on capturing the photos, we noticed that the glasses seemed a
little bit big on some of the participants who had thinner or smaller facial structures. This caused
OpenCV’s face detection script to detect their faces as the FacePET device failed to thwart the facial
features. We also observed that the illumination in the room where the experiment was conducted
diminished the effectiveness of the device. We plan to address these aspects in the future.
After using the FacePET system and answering the usability survey, 17 participants found the
system easy to understand and use. When asked if the device was something they would use on a
daily basis, nine participants answered affirmatively, while the rest stated that they would not use
the device in its current state. Within the group of participants who answered that they would not
use the device (12 participants), we asked if they would use a similar version of the device (one that
would achieve the same goals for privacy protection). In this question, 7 out of 12 participants
answered affirmatively.
Even though the original FacePET system is not a wearable that most of the participants would
use, when adding those participants who initially answered yes (9 participants) to use FacePET and
those who would use a similar version (7 participants), the majority of the participants (16
participants out of 21) would use FacePET or similar devices (i.e., other bystander-based devices) to
protect their facial privacy. Most of the concerns or reasons surrounding participants not wanting to
use the device seemed to be because of the device’s form factor. Some of these reasons indicated by
the participants included:
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The current model is too big and draws attention.
The model is not stylish and can obstruct vision.
Select participants do not really take pictures or engage in the media market in such a manner.

When the participants were asked about how people would react when seeing them wearing the
device, a variety of responses given were:
•
•
•
•
•

Person laughs and says, “Stupid glasses”.
People would stare a lot.
People would be confused at first or creeped out.
People would ask why the user was wearing such a device.
The device would only invite more people to take pictures of it.

From these answers, it seems there would be plenty of confusion on others around the user about
the purpose of the device and why someone would wear it in its current form factor. Despite the fact
that some of the feedback obtained relates specifically on our FacePET prototype, it is worth pointing
out that the majority of the participants did agree that if smart glasses had features to conceal users’
identities, it would allow such smart glasses to become more popular with 17 participants stating yes,
3 participants feeling indifferent, and 1 participant stating no. Finally, we gathered some suggestions
on how to improve our FacePET prototype. Some of the improvements that were repeated among
the responses include a more fashionable design, a better size (smaller) for the goggles, and fixing the
long wires that connect the power supply with the goggles and the microcontroller in the current
prototype.
4.3. Study Limitations
Due to the sample size (n = 21) of our study and because all participants recruited in our study
were from Columbus State University, the findings of this study cannot be generalized to a broader
population. Thus, if we conduct our study with a broader and more diverse population, we may
obtain different results to the ones currently presented in this work. As such, our conclusions are
written in terms that relate to our participants rather than a broader population. While our sample
size and its characteristics are similar to previous works that also used interviews, testing of devices
and the study of users in the wild [8,31,32,34,35,40], we acknowledge that to achieve external validity
we will need to scale our experiment to reach a broader population to increase both the sample size
and its diversity. To achieve this, we propose as future work the development of an experiment
wherein participants do not rely on the FacePET device for the study, but by using current advances
in AI in face and eye detection, we could simulate how a participant would look with a bystanderbased privacy protection device similar to FacePET, followed by participants interacting with an
interface that simulates the device, and finally have participants answer an online survey or record
them answering open questions about the simulated device. We plan to conduct this study in our
future research works.
5. Conclusions
In this work we conducted a user study to assess user perceptions about the FacePET system or
similar bystander-centric devices for facial privacy protection. We conducted our study with 21
participants who took a survey to gather information about facial and bystanders’ privacy, privacy
choices with cameras, and preferences about sharing photos. Participants then used the FacePET
wearable and answered a second survey about the usability and perceptions of the system and/or
similar devices. We found evidence that participants want some type of privacy protection when
photographed, especially in contexts that involve consumer/lifestyle habits, and they do not wish to
be photographed in contexts that involve health-related activities or locations. Participants also
showed concerns about their facial privacy when photos are taken and published without their
knowledge.
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When the participants used the FacePET system, we found that even though they would not use
the current prototype on a daily basis because of its bulkiness and unfashionable design, most of the
participants agreed that they would use a device similar to FacePET to protect their facial privacy.
Participants finally agreed that if smart glasses had features that would allow users to protect their
facial privacy, this feature would make smart glasses more popular with the general public.
For future work, we will develop a research study to recruit more participants and address the
external validity of the conclusions of our small study. To achieve this, we plan to create a research
protocol that does not require the utilization of a physical wearable (e.g., access to a FacePET
prototype) to scale the data collection. In addition, based on the results of the FacePET evaluation,
we plan to improve the appearance of the FacePET design. Finally, we plan also to improve the facial
privacy protection aspects of the device to protect against newer face detection and recognition
systems based on deep learning and Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs).
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